Based on the notion of bad faith, the article seeks to lay the foundations for a diagnosis of contemporaneity, having as an index, on the one hand, the lack of human determination and, on the other, the effectiveness of the world.

Internal misconduct is a universal problem in prisons and affects the maintenance of social order. Consequently, correctional institutions often develop rehabilitation programs to reduce the likelihood of inmates committing internal offenses and criminal recidivism after release. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the profile of each offender, both for the appropriate indication of a rehabilitation program and the level of internal security to which he must be submitted. In this context, this work aims to discover the most significant characteristics in (...) predicting inmate misconduct from ML methods and the SHAP approach. A database produced in 2004 through the Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities in the United States of America was used, which provides nationally representative data on prisoners from state and federal facilities. The predictive model based on Random Forest performed the best, thus, we applied the SHAP to it. Overall, the results showed that features related to victimization, type of crime committed, age and age at first arrest, history of association with criminal groups, education, and drug and alcohol use are most relevant in predicting internal misconduct. Thus, it is expected to contribute to the prior classification of an inmate on time, to use programs and practices that aim to improve the lives of offenders, their reintegration into society, and consequently, the reduction of criminal recidivism. (shrink)

Au cours de cet entretien, Emmanuel Renault nous offre un aperçu de la manière dont la thématique de la reconnaissance est traitée en France aujourd’hui, notamment à travers le renouveau des études sur Hegel et Marx. Il explique la façon dont la reconnaissance a pu s’ériger en paradigme (en dépit de ses usages multiples et variés en France comme ailleurs), au cours de la dernière décennie et le rôle joué par Axel Honneth dans ce procès. Finalement, il explicite sa manière (...) d’envisager la pratique de la philosophie politique et son projet d’une critique du capitalisme. Emmanuel Renault nous livre également un commentaire critique mais constructif sur la manière dont Paul Ricœur envisage la reconnaissance et suggère quelques pistes concernant les possibles développements futurs des usages de la reconnaissance. (shrink)

Multialgebras have been much studied in mathematics and in computer science. In 2016 Carnielli and Coniglio introduced a class of multialgebras called swap structures, as a semantic framework for dealing with several Logics of Formal Inconsistency that cannot be semantically characterized by a single finite matrix. In particular, these LFIs are not algebraizable by the standard tools of abstract algebraic logic. In this paper, the first steps towards a theory of non-deterministic algebraization of logics by swap structures are given. Specifically, (...) a formal study of swap structures for LFIs is developed, by adapting concepts of universal algebra to multialgebras in a suitable way. A decomposition theorem similar to Birkhoff’s representation theorem is obtained for each class of swap structures. Moreover, when applied to the 3-valued algebraizable logics J3 and Ciore, their classes of algebraic models are retrieved, and the swap structures semantics become twist structures semantics. This fact, together with the existence of a functor from the category of Boolean algebras to the category of swap structures for each LFI, suggests that swap structures can be seen as non-deterministic twist structures. This opens new avenues for dealing with non-algebraizable logics by the more general methodology of multialgebraic semantics. (shrink)

Despite being fairly powerful, finite non-deterministic matrices are unable to characterize some logics of formal inconsistency, such as those found between mbCcl and Cila. In order to overcome this limitation, we propose here restricted non-deterministic matrices (in short, RNmatrices), which are non-deterministic algebras together with a subset of the set of valuations. This allows us to characterize not only mbCcl and Cila (which is equivalent, up to language, to da Costa's logic C_1) but the whole hierarchy of da Costa's calculi (...) C_n. This produces a novel decision procedure for these logics. Moreover, we show that the RNmatrix semantics proposed here induces naturally a labelled tableau system for each C_n, which constitutes another decision procedure for these logics. This new semantics allows us to conceive da Costa's hierarchy of C-systems as a family of (non deterministically) (n+2)-valued logics, where n is the number of "inconsistently true" truth-values and 2 is the number of "classical" or "consistent" truth-values, for every C_n. (shrink)

blandior ratio : C, 34). I will first survey how extensive, albeit usually overlooked, is Leibniz’s concern with these “weaker” forms of reasoning, and how crucial they are for many of his practical and theoretical endeavors. I will then trace back this acute need of Leibniz´s brand of rationalism to the peculiar nature of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), as opposed to the other basic principle of his philosophy, the Principle of Contradiction (PC). I will present here only the (...) bare bones of the argument, in a sort of extended summary, omitting the textual support as well the references to the relevant secondary literature. (shrink)

Dichotomies are ubiquitous in deliberative thinking, in decision making and in arguing in all spheres of life.[i] Sticking uncompromisingly to a dichotomy may lead to sharp disagreement and paradox, but it can also sharpen the issues at stake and help to find a solution. Dichotomies are particularly in evidence in debates, i.e., in argumentative dialogical exchanges characterized by their agonistic nature. The protagonists in a debate worth its name hold positions that are or that they take to be opposed; they (...) argue against each other’s positions; and they defend their positions from the adversary’s attacks. In some cases, this may lead to a polarization of the debate through treating it as grounded on one or more dichotomies. In others, the contenders may construe the opposition as non-dichotomous and therefore less irreconcilable. Whereas the former attitude, which leads to ‘dichotomization’, is likely to radicalize a debate, rendering it difficult – sometimes impossible – to resolve, the latter, which leads to ‘de-dichotomization’, opens possibilities of solution of the debate other than all out victory of one side and defeat of the other. In addition to its effect on the outcome of a debate, the contenders’ attitude towards dichotomies in the debate’s management has further, important implications. It is intrinsically connected with the typology of debates and their typical argumentative moves. For the appropriateness of one or the other of these attitudes for best capturing the nature of the antagonism that underlies a debate is in fact an indicator of the kind of debate it actually is or is perceived by the contenders to be. Furthermore, such ‘attitudes’ are expressed by the contenders’ preferred choices of argumentative moves; and these, in turn, can be recognized, in a given debate context, as subservient either to a dichotomizing or to a de-dichotomizing strategy vis-à-vis a dichotomy taken to be at the root of the divergence. (shrink)

Trying to overcome Dugundji’s result on uncharacterisability of modal logics by finite logical matrices, Kearns and Ivlev proposed, independently, a characterisation of some modal systems by means of four-valued multivalued truth-functions , as an alternative to Kripke semantics. This constitutes an antecedent of the non-deterministic matrices introduced by Avron and Lev . In this paper we propose a reconstruction of Kearns’s and Ivlev’s results in a uniform way, obtaining an extension to another modal systems. The first part of the paper (...) is devoted to four-valued Nmatrices, including Kearns’s and Ivlev’s. Besides proving with full details Kearns’s results for T, S4 and S5, we also obtain a characterisation of the system B by four-valued Nmatrices with level valuations. Concerning Ivlev’s results, two new modal systems are introduced and char.. (shrink)

En este artículo quiero presentar y defender la tesis de que el impasse en que se encuentran la epistemología y la historia de la ciencia desde hace un par de décadas se debe en gran parte, o bien a la total ignorancia. o bien al tratamiento equivocado del rol jugado por las controversias científicas en la evolución de la ciencia. Para hacerlo, tendré que empezar por una aclaración preliminar del impasse a que me refiero (sección 1). Luego, explicaré por qué (...) veo en el estudio de las controversias científicas una pieza fundamental para solucionarlo (sección 2), identificaré la posición de díchas controversias en el seno del conjunto de los fenómenos empíricos del tipo 'discurso polémico' (sección 3) e indicaré las propiedades de tales controversias que explican su rol potencial para solventar el impasse (sección 4). Pasaré enseguida a mostrar el modo en que las opciones epistemológicas existentes son incapaces de tratar las controversias de manera satisfactoria, lo que explica su incapacidad para resolver el impasse (sección S). Más adelante expondré un desideratum esencial para resolver ese impasse (sección 6), e indicaré de qué manera cabe satisfacerlo empleando la pragmática como instrumento y como modelo (sección 7). Lo que se me antojó, en un principio, un artículo relativamente corto, se ha ido transformando progresivamente en un texto complejo y extenso, más digno de un ensayo. He tratado de acortarlo, reduciéndolo a lo esencial. De ahí que algunas afirmaciones puedan parecer dogmáticas e insuficientemente fundamentadas. Espero cumplir con el onus probando que me compete llevar a cabo en el prometido ensayo. Pero no quise dejar de publicar su esbozo en estas reflexiones, para poder - cuando menos así lo espero- beneficiarme de la crítica. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to combine several Ivlev-like modal systems characterized by 4-valued non-deterministic matrices (Nmatrices) with $$\mathcal {IDM}4$$, a 4-valued expansion of Belnap–Dunn’s logic $$FDE$$ with an implication introduced by Pynko in 1999. In order to do this, we introduce a new methodology for combining logics which are characterized by means of swap structures, based on what we call superposition of snapshots. In particular, the combination of $$\mathcal {IDM}4$$ with $$Tm$$, the 4-valued Ivlev’s version of KT, will (...) be analyzed with more details. From the semantical perspective, the idea is to combine the 4-valued swap structures (Nmatrices) for $$Tm$$ (and several of its extensions) with the 4-valued twist structure (logical matrix) for $$\mathcal {IDM}4$$. This superposition produces a universe of 6 snapshots, with 3 of them being designated. The multioperators over the new universe are defined by combining the specifications of the given swap and twist structures. This gives rise to 6 different paradefinite Ivlev-like modal logics, each one of them characterized by a 6-valued Nmatrix, and conservatively extending the original modal logic and $$\mathcal {IDM}4$$. This important feature allows to consider the proposed construction as a genuine technique for combining logics. In addition, it is possible to define in the combined logics a classicality operator in the sense of logics of evidence and truth (LETs). A sound and complete Hilbert-style axiomatization is also presented for the 6 combined systems, as well as a Prolog program which implements the swap structures semantics for the 6 systems, producing a decision procedure for satisfiability, refutability and validity of formulas in these logics. (shrink)

The long-standing tradition of phenomenological psychopathology has been historically concerned with the nature of mental disorders, with a special focus on their basic experiential core. In the same way, much of the recent phenomenologically-inspired work in psychopathology consists in providing precise and refined tools for diagnosis, classification, and nosology of mental disorders. What is striking, however, is the lack of therapeutic proposals in this tradition. Although a number of phenomenological approaches refer positively to psychotherapeutic practices, psychopharmacological intervention has been mostly (...) neglected as a relevant field of attention. This work aims to fill this gap. We maintain that the convergence of phenomenological psychopathology and psychopharmacology exhibit a rich potential for mutual enlightenment, which unfolds into a more adequate psychopharmacological practice. Initially, after discussing Joanna Moncrieff’s drug-centered model of drug action we review some of the major findings in phenomenological literature regarding psychopharmacological treatment. Next, we suggest that Moncrieff’s drug-centered model can be seen as an important tool for improving clinical decision-making, by elucidating its inherent epistemic advantage when compared to mainstream models of drug action. As a result, the drug-centered model proves to be also patient-centered, by focusing on experiential alterations and helping to improve treatment outcomes. (shrink)

In this interview, conducted by Gonçalo Marcelo, Richard Kearney recaps his intellectual trajectory, commenting on his early works on imagination and his own narrative style of doing philosophy in order then to make explicit the deep connection between the more recent developments of Carnal Hermeneutics, Reimagining the Sacred and the work done with others in the context of the Guestbook Project. Drawing on some lesser-known aspects of his work, he emphasizes the carnal dimension of recognition and discusses the pitfalls (...) of the Age of Excarnation. Finally, and as part of his ongoing role as a public intellectual, he also comments on Europe’s social and political situation and the dangers it faces (exacerbated secularization, the threat of terrorism, Brexit) arguing for a pedagogy of narrative exchange as a means to foster hospitality and inclusion. (shrink)

Dugundji proved in 1940 that most parts of standard modal systems cannot be characterized by a single finite deterministic matrix. In the eighties, Ivlev proposed a semantics of four-valued non-deterministic matrices, in order to characterize a hierarchy of weak modal logics without the necessitation rule. In a previous paper, we extended some systems of Ivlev’s hierarchy, also proposing weaker six-valued systems in which the axiom was replaced by the deontic axiom. In this paper, we propose even weaker systems, by eliminating (...) both axioms, which are characterized by eight-valued non-deterministic matrices. In addition, we prove completeness for those new systems. It is natural to ask if a characterization by finite ordinary logical matrices would be possible for all those Ivlev-like systems. We will show that finite deterministic matrices do not characterize any of them. (shrink)

_Ever since Descartes singled out the ability to use natural language appropriately in any given circumstance as the proof_ _that humans – unlike animals and machines – have minds, an idea that Turing transformed into his well-known test to_ _determine whether machines have intelligence, the close connection between language and cognition has been widely_ _acknowledged, although it was accounted for in quite different ways. Recent advances in natural language processing, as_ _well as attempts to create “embodied conversational agents” which couple (...) language processing with that of its natural_ _bodily correlates (gestures, facial expression and gaze direction), in the hope of developing human-computer interfaces_ _based on natural – rather than formal – language, have again brought to the fore the question of how far we can hope_ _machines to be able to master the cognitive abilities required for language use. In this paper, I approach this issue from a_ _different angle, inquiring whether language can be viewed as a “cognitive technology”, employed by humans as a tool_ _for the performance of certain cognitive tasks. I propose a definition of “cognitive technology” that encompasses both_ _external (or “prosthetic”) and internal cognitive devices. A number of parameters in terms of which a typology of_ _cognitive technologies of both kinds can be sketched is also set forth. It is then argued that inquiring about language’s_ _role in cognition allows us to re-frame the traditional debate about the relationship between language and thought, by_ _examining how specific aspects of language actually influence cognition – as an environment, a resource, or a tool. This_ _perspective helps bring together the contributions of the philosophical “linguistic turn” in epistemology and the incipient_ _“epistemology of cognitive technology” It also permits a more precise and fruitful discussion of the question whether, to_ _what extent, and which of the language-based cognitive technologies we naturally use can be emulated by the kinds of_ _technologies presently or in the foreseeable future available.shrink)

We analyze the variety of A. Monteiro’s tetravalent modal algebras under the perspective of two logic systems naturally associated to it. Taking profit of the contrapositive implication introduced by A. Figallo and P. Landini, sound and complete Hilbert-style calculi for these logics are presented.

Free will skepticism is the view that people never truly deserve to be praised, blamed, or punished for what they do. One challenge free will skeptics face is to explain how criminality could be dealt with given their skepticism. This paper critically examines the prospects of implementing legal changes concerning crime and punishment derived from the free will skeptical views developed by Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso. One central aspect of the changes their views require is a concern for reducing (...) the severity of current forms of punishment. The paper considers two strategies for pursuing such a reduction. By taking into account evidence from the psychology of belief in free will and desire to punish, it is argued that a strategy aiming at a reduction of people’s natural desire to punish criminals can be successful if capable of providing alternatives to current forms of punishment satisfying three properties: they must be less harmful than current forms of punishment, more effective in preventing crime, and incompatible with current forms of punishment. (shrink)

Whereas the most visible forms of political colonialism have for the most part disappeared from the planet by the end of the millennium, several of its consequences remain with us. Criticism of colonialism, accordingly, has shifted its focus to its more subtle and lasting manifestations. Prominent among these are the varieties of what came to be known as the ‘colonization of the mind’. This is one of the forms of ‘epistemic violence’ that it is certainly the task of philosophers to (...) contribute to identify and struggle against. ‘Postcolonial’ thinkers have undertaken not only to analyze this phenomenon, but also to devise strategies for effectively combating and hopefully eradicating colonialism’s most damaging aspect – the taking possession and control of its victims’ minds. My purpose in this paper is to contribute, qua philosopher, to both of these undertakings. I begin by trying to clarify the nature of the colonization of the mind and its epistemic underpinnings and the typical reactions to it. Next, I examine examples of these reactions with their corresponding analyses and strategies. The assumptions underlying them reveal certain inherent paradoxes, which call into question the possibility of a full decolonization of mind. I conclude by suggesting an alternative strategy and a series of means to implement it. (shrink)

Suszko's Thesis maintains that many-valued logics do not exist at all. In order to support it, R. Suszko offered a method for providing any structural abstract logic with a complete set of bivaluations. G. Malinowski challenged Suszko's Thesis by constructing a new class of logics (called q-logics by him) for which Suszko's method fails. He argued that the key for logical two-valuedness was the "bivalent" partition of the Lindenbaum bundle associated with all structural abstract logics, while his q-logics were generated (...) by "trivalent" matrices. This paper will show that contrary to these intuitions, logical two-valuedness has more to do with the geometrical properties of the deduction relation of a logical structure than with the algebraic properties embedded on it. (shrink)

From Gadamer's Habilitation thesis, “Plato’s dialectical ethics. Phenomenological Interpretations Relating to the Philebus” (1928), this article seeks to highlight the fundamental lines of Plato’s image, outlined in that author’s first philosophical publication (1931). The confrontation with the themes of ethics and dialectic, in the current state of Platonic studies, indicates that in Plato’s image drawn in the early confrontation with the Philebus, clearly influenced by the phenomenological notion of Dasein, one already finds the fundamental features of what will become Gadamer's (...) philosophical hermeneutics, fully emancipated from Heideggerian tutelage. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper we analyzed finite non-deterministic matrix semantics for propositional non-normal modal logics as an alternative to the standard Kripke possible world semantics. This kind of modal system characterized by finite non-deterministic matrices was originally proposed by Ju. Ivlev in the 70s. The aim of this second paper is to introduce a formal non-deterministic semantical framework for the quantified versions of some Ivlev-like non-normal modal logics. It will be shown that several well-known controversial issues of (...) quantified modal logics, relative to the identity predicate, Barcan’s formulas and de re and de dicto modalities, can be tackled from a new angle within the present framework. (shrink)

In abstract algebraic logic, many systems, such as those paraconsistent logics taking inspiration from da Costa's hierarchy, are not algebraizable by even the broadest standard methodologies, as that of Blok and Pigozzi. However, these logics can be semantically characterized by means of non-deterministic algebraic structures such as Nmatrices, RNmatrices and swap structures. These structures are based on multialgebras, which generalize algebras by allowing the result of an operation to assume a non-empty set of values. This leads to an interest in (...) exploring the foundations of multialgebras applied to the study of logic systems. It is well known from universal algebra that, for every signature \, there exist algebras over \ which are absolutely free, meaning that they do not satisfy any identities or, alternatively, satisfy the universal mapping property for the class of \-algebras. Furthermore, once we fix a cardinality of the generating set, they are, up to isomorphisms, unique, and equal to algebras of terms. Equivalently, the forgetful functor, from the category of \-algebras to Set, has a left adjoint. This result does not extend to multialgebras. Not only multialgebras satisfying the universal mapping property do not exist, but the forgetful functor \, from the category of \-multialgebras to Set, does not have a left adjoint. In this paper we generalize, in a natural way, algebras of terms to multialgebras of terms, whose family of submultialgebras enjoys many properties of the former. One example is that, to every pair consisting of a function, from a submultialgebra of a multialgebra of terms to another multialgebra, and a collection of choices, there corresponds a unique homomorphism, what resembles the universal mapping property. Another example is that the multialgebras of terms are generated by a set that may be viewed as a strong basis, which we call the ground of the multialgebra. Submultialgebras of multialgebras of terms are what we call weakly free multialgebras. Finally, with these definitions at hand, we offer a simple proof that multialgebras with the universal mapping property for the class of all multialgebras do not exist and that \ does not have a left adjoint. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a characterization of the intellectual virtue of social inquisitiveness, paying attention to its difference from the individual virtue of inquisitiveness. I defend that there is a significant distinction between individual and social epistemic virtues: individual epistemic virtues are attributed to individuals and assessed by the quality of their cognitive powers, while social epistemic virtues are attributed to epistemic communities and are assessed by the quality of the epistemic relations within the communities. I begin presenting Lani (...) Watson's characterization of the (individual) practice of questioning and its related intellectual virtue, inquisitiveness. While she does not employ normative language, I show that her description can be constructed through four norms. Then, based on an account of epistemic communities, I defend that, while epistemic virtues attributable to individuals have norms regulating cognitive powers, epistemic virtues attributable to epistemic communities have norms regulating social epistemic interactions and shared epistemic responsibility. I then present a robust characterization of the epistemic virtue of social inquisitiveness through its social epistemic norms: DISTRIBUTION, ACCESSIBILITY, SOCIAL SINCERITY, SOCIAL CONTEXT, and FREQUENCY. I respond to two possible objections to my account and conclude by offering suggestions to broaden the scope of the epistemology of questioning. (shrink)

Tarski asked whether the arithmetic identities taught in high school are complete for showing all arithmetic equations valid for the natural numbers. The answer to this question for the language of arithmetic expressions using a constant for the number one and the operations of product and exponentiation is affirmative, and the complete equational theory also characterises isomorphism in the typed lambda calculus, where the constant for one and the operations of product and exponentiation respectively correspond to the unit type and (...) the product and arrow type constructors. This paper studies isomorphisms in typed lambda calculi with empty and sum types from this viewpoint. Our main contribution is to show that a family of so-called Wilkie–Gurevič identities, that plays a pivotal role in the study of Tarski’s high school algebra problem, arises from type-theoretic isomorphisms. We thus close an open problem by establishing that the theory of type isomorphisms in the presence of product, arrow, and sum types is not finitely axiomatisable. Further, we observe that for type theories with arrow, empty and sum types the correspondence between isomorphism and arithmetic equality generally breaks down, but that it still holds in some particular cases including that of type isomorphism with the empty type and equality with zero. (shrink)

The big Leibnizian news from Israel is that from October 1st up to September 30 we are running here, at the Institute of Advanced Studies, a research project centered on our beloved hero. The project, involves scholars as well as graduate students from many countries. Some will be fellows of the Institute for practically the whole year [Marcelo Dascal, Gideon Freudenthal, Massimo Mugnai, Carl Posy, Quintin Racionero, Elhanan Yakira ]. Other colleagues will be here for shorter periods [, Ezequiel (...) de Olaso, Kuno Lorenz, Alan Gross, Maria Rosa Antognazza, Olga Pombo, Marta Spranzi-Zuber, Mirella Saim, etc.]. Several other scholars have been also participating regularly in our seminars and working sessions, which have been so far very lively. We are working in parallel paths: A. trying to learn about other approaches to controversies and to develop our own approach; B. studying Leibniz’s own theory or theories of controversies; C. studying Leibniz’s practice of controversy, in several particular cases. (shrink)

L'œuvre de Michel Foucault est inclassable car elle traverse des domaines très variés (philosophie, sociologie, histoire, anthropologie, criminologie, médecine, psychologie, linguistique, droit, etc.). Foucault n'est pas un sociologue au sens classique du terme. Il existe une sociologie puissante et novatrice chez lui. Mais laquelle? À quoi peut-elle servir aujourd'hui? En quoi est-elle utile pour théoriser les problèmes sociaux? Quels sont ses avantages et ses inconvénients? Quel type de « raisonnement sociologique » se dégage de son œuvre et quelles sont ses (...) limites? Voilà les interrogations qui guident l'analyse de l'ensemble des travaux de Foucault dans cet ouvrage. En suivant l'évolution historique de ses recherches ainsi que les retournements stimulants de sa pensée, Foucault Sociologue s'organise en neuf chapitres qui suivent l'évolution théorique, méthodologique et chronologique des thématiques foucaldiennes. Marcelo Otero est professeur titulaire au Département de sociologie de l'Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM), chercheur au Centre de recherche de Montréal sur les inégalités sociales, les discriminations et les pratiques alternatives de citoyenneté (CREMIS), au groupe sur le médicament comme objet social (MÉOS) et à l'Institut Santé et Société (ISS). Ses recherches portent sur les nouveaux problèmes de santé mentale et les problèmes sociaux complexes."--Quatrième de couverture. (shrink)

RESUMEN En este artículo abordamos la cuestión del poder en el pensamiento de Deleuze. Según nuestra hipótesis, no hay en su obra un único concepto de poder sino diferentes enfoques no incompatibles entre sí pero que no se dejan reducir a un solo punto de vista. Esta variedad de abordajes puede ser reunida alrededor de dos posiciones generales adoptadas por Deleuze: primero, tiende a relativizar su eficacia respecto de otros elementos más fundamentales, realzando así los límites o la impotencia del (...) poder; segundo, le quita valor con relación a otras entidades y procesos en los que deposita su apuesta filosófica. Nos proponemos desarrollar estas perspectivas a fin de ofrecer un panorama integral de una temática relevante de la filosofía política deleuziana. ABSTRACT In this article, we address the question of power in Deleuze's thinking. According to our hypothesis, there is not a single concept of power in his work, but different approaches not incompatible with each other but that cannot be reduced to a single point of view. This variety of approaches can be gathered around two general positions about power, adopted by Deleuze: first, he tends to relativize its effectiveness with respect to other more fundamental elements, thus enhancing the limits or impotence of power; second, he takes away value in relation to other entities and processes in which he places his philosophical commitment. We intend to develop these perspectives in order to offer a comprehensive overview of a relevant theme of Deleuzian political philosophy. (shrink)

Michel Foucault is one of the most preeminent theorists of power, yet the relationship between his militant activities and his analysis of power remains unclear. The book explores this relationship to explain the development of Foucault's thinking about power. Using newly translated and unpublished materials, it examines what led Foucault to take on the question of power in the early 1970s and subsequently refine his thinking, working through different models (war and government) and modalities (sovereign, disciplinary, biopolitical, pastoral and governmental). (...) Looking at Foucault's political trajectory, from his involvement with the prisoner support movement and Solidarity to his controversial engagement with the Iranian revolution, the book shows the militant underpinning of his interest in the question of power and its various shifts and mutations. This thorough account, which includes the first translation of a report edited by Foucault on prison conditions, will provide students in contemporary political theory with a better understanding of Foucault's thinking about power and of the interplay between political activities and theoretical productions. (shrink)

In 1940 Dugundji proved that no system between S1 and S5 can be characterized by finite matrices. Dugundji’s result forced the development of alternative semantics, in particular Kripke’s relational semantics. The success of this semantics allowed the creation of a huge family of modal systems. With few adaptations, this semantics can characterize almost the totality of the modal systems developed in the last five decades. This semantics however has some limits. Two results of incompleteness showed that not every modal logic (...) can be characterized by Kripke frames. Besides, the creation of non-classical modal logics puts the problem of characterization of finite matrices very far away from the original scope of Dugundji’s result. In this sense, we will show how to update Dugundji’s result in order to make precise the scope and the limits of many-valued matrices as semantic of modal systems. A brief comparison with the useful Chagrov and Zakharyaschev’s criterion of tabularity for modal logics is provided. (shrink)

This article situates The Course of Recognition in the context of Ricœurian philosophy and contemporary debates on mutual recognition. This article reconstructs the debate between Ricœur and mainstream recognition scholars, as well as with the other figures, such as Boltanski, Thévenot and Hénaff, who had a direct influence in the way Ricœur fleshed out his alternative conception of recognition. By connecting recognition with Ricœur’s notions of ideology and utopia, we are able to uncover a major blind spot in the standard (...) model of recognition,and to undo ideological and reified forms of recognition. Honneth and Ricœur both aim at societies whose members are duly recognized, but they do so in radically different manners. Whereas Honneth’s model must be politicized in order to become relevant to social change, Ricœur evisages social change in a pure ethics of recognition. (shrink)

Judging a person as morally responsible involves believing that certain responses (such as punishment, reward, or expressions of blame or praise) can be justifiably directed at the person. This paper develops an account of the evolution of moral responsibility judgment that adopts Michael Tomasello’s two-step theory of the evolution of morality and borrows also from Christopher Boehm’s work. The main hypothesis defended is that moral responsibility judgment originally evolved as an adaptation that enabled groups of cooperative individuals to hold free (...) riders responsible more safely by acting in a coordinated way. (shrink)

I am grateful to my friend, Professor Heinrich Schepers, editor of volume VI.4 of Leibniz’s Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, for the time and critical attention he devotes to my lengthy review of this volume, in a detailed reply included in the present issue of this journal. Since I believe that criticism and discussion are the master key to intellectual progress, I consider myself to be extremely lucky that my painstaking work has been the object of criticism by the scholar who (...) is most familiar with the texts published in VI.4. I am also grateful to Professor Glenn Hartz, editor of The Leibniz Review, for granting me the opportunity to publish a rejoinder, generously stretching the deadline for its submission, so that it could appear along with Professor Schepers’ reply. I hope this critical exchange will foster further discussion of the issues it touches upon, particularly the reassessment of the nature of Leibniz’s rationalism, and that Leibniz scholarship will be thereby rewarded. (shrink)

The 3-valued paraconsistent logic Ciore was developed by Carnielli, Marcos and de Amo under the name LFI2, in the study of inconsistent databases from the point of view of logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs). They also considered a first-order version of Ciore called LFI2*. The logic Ciore enjoys extreme features concerning propagation and retropropagation of the consistency operator: a formula is consistent if and only if some of its subformulas is consistent. In addition, Ciore is algebraizable in the sense of (...) Blok and Pigozzi. On the other hand, the logic LFI2* satisfies a somewhat counter-intuitive property: the universal and the existential quantifier are inter-definable by means of the paraconsistent negation, as it happens in classical first-order logic with respect to the classical negation. This feature seems to be unnatural, given that both quantifiers have the classical meaning in LFI2*, and that this logic does not satisfy the De Morgan laws with respect to its paraconsistent negation. The first goal of the present article is to introduce a first-order version of Ciore (which we call QCiore) preserving the spirit of Ciore, that is, without introducing unexpected relationships between the quantifiers. The second goal of the article is to adapt to QCiore the partial structures semantics for the first-order paraconsistent logic LPT1 introduced by Coniglio and Silvestrini, which generalizes the semantic notion of quasi-truth considered by Mikeberg, da Costa and Chuaqui. Finally, some important results of classical Model Theory are obtained for this logic, such as Robinson’s joint consistency theorem, amalgamation and interpolation. Although we focus on QCiore, this framework can be adapted to other 3-valued first-order LFIs. (shrink)

I am grateful to my friend, Professor Heinrich Schepers, editor of volume VI.4 of Leibniz’s Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, for the time and critical attention he devotes to my lengthy review of this volume, in a detailed reply included in the present issue of this journal. Since I believe that criticism and discussion are the master key to intellectual progress, I consider myself to be extremely lucky that my painstaking work has been the object of criticism by the scholar who (...) is most familiar with the texts published in VI.4. I am also grateful to Professor Glenn Hartz, editor of The Leibniz Review, for granting me the opportunity to publish a rejoinder, generously stretching the deadline for its submission, so that it could appear along with Professor Schepers’ reply. I hope this critical exchange will foster further discussion of the issues it touches upon, particularly the reassessment of the nature of Leibniz’s rationalism, and that Leibniz scholarship will be thereby rewarded. (shrink)

Resumo: Em décadas recentes, a investigação filosófica sobre a responsabilidade moral e o livre-arbítrio, que por muito tempo foi vista como um empreendimento principalmente teórico, passou a também incluir preocupações de tipo mais prático. Essa mudança é bem ilustrada pela proposta cética desenvolvida por autores como Derk Pereboom e Gregg Caruso. Seus trabalhos não apenas negam que sejamos agentes livres e moralmente responsáveis (em um sentido específico dos termos em questão), mas também defendem reformas na maneira como a responsabilização é (...) efetivada em nossas relações interpessoais e, especialmente, no sistema penal. Este artigo examina as implicações práticas do ceticismo de Pereboom e Caruso, principalmente no que diz respeito à sua implementabilidade. Argumento que o núcleo propriamente cético da proposta é inviável para seres humanos com a psicologia moral que temos, mas que, apesar disso, alguns elementos da proposta são compatíveis com uma proposta não-cética focada no aperfeiçoamento das práticas punitivas. Abstract: In recent decades, the philosophical investigation of moral responsibility and free will, which for a long time was seen as a mostly theoretical enterprise, became also the place of more practically oriented concerns. The skeptical view developed by Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso is a good illustration of the change. In their work, they not just deny that we are free and morally responsible agents (in a specific sense of the relevant terms) but also propose the reform of responsibility practices as they figure in our interpersonal relations and, especially, in the criminal justice system. This paper examines the practical implications of Pereboom and Caruso’s skepticism, particularly in what concerns its likelihood of being implemented. I argue that the strictly skeptical core of their proposal is not viable for human beings with a moral psychology like ours, but that some elements are nonetheless consistent with a non-skeptical view focused on the improvement of punitive practices. (shrink)

In abstract algebraic logic, many systems, such as those paraconsistent logics taking inspiration from da Costa's hierarchy, are not algebraizable by even the broadest standard methodologies, as that of Blok and Pigozzi. However, these logics can be semantically characterized by means of non-deterministic algebraic structures such as Nmatrices, RNmatrices and swap structures. These structures are based on multialgebras, which generalize algebras by allowing the result of an operation to assume a non-empty set of values. This leads to an interest in (...) exploring the foundations of multialgebras applied to the study of logic systems. -/- It is well known from universal algebra that, for every signature Sigma, there exist algebras over Sigma which are absolutely free, meaning that they do not satisfy any identities or, alternatively, satisfy the universal mapping property for the class of Sigma-algebras. Furthermore, once we fix a cardinality of the generating set, they are, up to isomorphisms, unique, and equal to algebras of terms (or propositional formulas, in the context of logic). Equivalently, the forgetful functor, from the category of Sigma-algebras to Set, has a left adjoint. This result does not extend to multialgebras. Not only multialgebras satisfying the universal mapping property do not exist, but the forgetful functor U, from the category of Sigma-multialgebras to Set, does not have a left adjoint. -/- In this paper we generalize, in a natural way, algebras of terms to multialgebras of terms, whose family of submultialgebras enjoys many properties of the former. One example is that, to every pair consisting of a function, from a submultialgebra of a multialgebra of terms to another multialgebra, and a collection of choices (which selects how a homomorphism approaches indeterminacies), there corresponds a unique homomorphism, what resembles the universal mapping property. Another example is that the multialgebras of terms are generated by a set that may be viewed as a strong basis, which we call the ground of the multialgebra. Submultialgebras of multialgebras of terms are what we call weakly free multialgebras. Finally, with these definitions at hand, we offer a simple proof that multialgebras with the universal mapping property for the class of all multialgebras do not exist and that U does not have a left adjoint. (shrink)

ABSTRACT We introduce a two-dimensional temporal logic as a formalism which enables the description of both the history of a world and the evolution of an observer's views about the history. We apply such formalism to the description of certain problems that occur in historical database systems due to updates. The historical dimension describes the history of a world according to an observer's view at a certain moment in time. The transaction dimension describes the evolution of an observer's view; changes (...) can occur in the observer's view of the present and future as well as in his views of the past. The database is seens as an observer of the history of the world. Besides describing the history of the world, the database system can also execute temporal specifications in the form of temporal actions. The two-dimensional formalism is used to describe the effects of updates in the execution of temporal actions. The detection of some problematic effects and its implementation are discussed. (shrink)

Multialgebras (or hyperalgebras) have been very much studied in the literature. In the realm of Logic, they were considered by Avron and his collaborators under the name of non-deterministic matrices (or Nmatrices) as a useful semantics tool for characterizing some logics (in particular, several logics of formal inconsistency or LFIs) which cannot be characterized by a single finite matrix. In particular, these LFIs are not algebraizable by any method, including Blok and Pigozzi general theory. Carnielli and Coniglio introduced a semantics (...) of swap structures for LFIs, which are Nmatrices defined over triples in a Boolean algebra, generalizing Avron's semantics. In this paper we develop the first steps towards the possibility of defining an algebraic theory of swap structures for LFIs, by adapting concepts of universal algebra to multialgebras in a suitable way. (shrink)

Diana Pérez criticizes Davidson’s argument for the thesis that there is no thought without language, and offers an alternative defense of that thesis on the basis of empirical studies on developmental psychology. In this comment I argue that more recent studies do not seem to affect Davidson’s argument in the way Pérez suggests, and that her alternative defense of the thesis that there is no thought without language is insufficient. At the end, I offer a sketch of how a weaker (...) and more tenable version of the argument could be articulated. (shrink)

The European Universities Initiative (EUI), created by the European Commission in 2017, is a recent novel phenomenon within the European Union policy toolkit that explicitly targets the development of transnational cooperation in higher education (HE). To date, the EUI counts 44 European university alliances, involving around 340 HE institutions. In this paper, we argue that the EUI can be seen as a case of a transnational institution building process representing a potentially significant structural reform for European higher education. Anchored in (...) new institutionalism, we explore the regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive dimensions of the EUI. Methodologically, this study analyzes the perspectives of European policy actors (n = 4), a set of policy documents (n = 13) and the mission statements of the EUI’s partnerships funded before 2022 (n = 41). The results show that the EUI emerges as the ‘next level of cooperation’ in European HE since it aims to transform European cooperation (regulative dimension), to create and diffuse a new model for European HE following a challenge-based approach (normative dimension), and to work as a way to reinforce and institutionalize European and global scripts for European HE (cultural-cognitive dimension). (shrink)

This paper aims to offer an Aristotelian critique of virtue epistemology, particularly of the way virtue epistemologists use the concept of intellectual virtue in their definitions of knowledge. I engage with David Bronstein’s thesis that virtue reliabilists, despite claims of being contemporary representatives of Aristotle’s epistemology, construct their key epistemic categories in ways that fundamentally deviate from Aristotle’s own virtue epistemology. In addition to Bronstein’s argument, I will argue that a similar critique applies to the other main branch of virtue (...) epistemology – namely, Zagzebski’s responsibilism. I intend to clarify both the gist of contemporary virtue epistemologists and the motivation behind their approaches, highlighting that, not only do they differ from Aristotle, but also that their theories run the risk of vicious circular reasoning. I conclude by proposing alternative options, within virtue epistemology, that may avoid the problems I identify in mainstream virtue reliabilism and responsibilism. (shrink)

El artículo se centra en los probables trasfondos socráticos de la teoría de la acción aristotélica. El autor argumenta que Aristóteles incorporó a su propia teoría de la acción los siguientes ingredientes, que son de carácter “socrático”: la tesis de que un agente siempre lleva a cabo una acción en vista del bien o, más bien, de lo que considera que es bueno; la opinión de que hay un momento cognitivo que es previo a la búsqueda de lo que uno (...) considera que es bueno, y la idea de que, para neutralizar “el poder de la apariencia” al intentar distinguir apropiadamente el bien aparente del real, el agente debe fortalecer o refinar sus capacidades cognitivas tanto como sus estados de carácter. This paper focuses on the probable Socratic backgrounds to Aristotle's theory of action. The author argues that Aristotle incorporated into his own theory of action the following ingredients, which are “Socratic” in character: the thesis that an agent always performs an action for the sake of the good or rather of what he or she considers to be good; the view that there is a cognitive moment which is previous to the search for what one regards to be good, and the idea that, in order to neutralize “the power of appearance” when attempting to properly distinguish the apparent from the real good, the agent should strengthen or refine his cognitive abilities as well as his states of character. (shrink)

Belnap–Dunn’s relevance logic, \(\textsf{BD}\), was designed seeking a suitable logical device for dealing with multiple information sources which sometimes may provide inconsistent and/or incomplete pieces of information. \(\textsf{BD}\) is a four-valued logic which is both paraconsistent and paracomplete. On the other hand, De and Omori, while investigating what classical negation amounts to in a paracomplete and paraconsistent four-valued setting, proposed the expansion \(\textsf{BD2}\) of the four valued Belnap–Dunn logic by a classical negation. In this paper, we introduce a four-valued expansion (...) of BD called \({\textsf{BD}^\copyright }\), obtained by adding an unary connective \({\copyright }\,\ \) which is a consistency operator (in the sense of the Logics of Formal Inconsistency, _LFI_s). In addition, this operator is the unique one with the following features: it extends to \(\textsf{BD}\) the consistency operator of LFI1, a well-known three-valued _LFI_, still satisfying axiom _ciw_ (which states that any sentence is either consistent or contradictory), and allowing to define an undeterminedness operator (in the sense of Logic of Formal Undeterminedness, _LFU_s). Moreover, \({\textsf{BD}^\copyright }\) is maximal w.r.t. LFI1, and it is proved to be equivalent to BD2, up to signature. After presenting a natural Hilbert-style characterization of \({\textsf{BD}^\copyright }\) obtained by means of twist-structures semantics, we propose a first-order version of \({\textsf{BD}^\copyright }\) called \({\textsf{QBD}^\copyright }\), with semantics based on an appropriate notion of four-valued Tarskian-like structures called \(\textbf{4}\) -structures. We show that in \({\textsf{QBD}^\copyright }\), the existential and universal quantifiers are interdefinable in terms of the paracomplete and paraconsistent negation, and not by means of the classical negation. Finally, a Hilbert-style calculus for \({\textsf{QBD}^\copyright }\) is presented, proving the corresponding soundness and completeness theorems. (shrink)

Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism has been repeatedly criticized since its initial defense in the paper Mental Events, which was published in 1970. Despite the widespread rejection, there seems to be no agreement on why anomalous monism fails. This paper systematizes two strong objections to anomalous monism. First, Davidson’s argument for monism requires the problematic assumption that physics can provide strict causal laws for causal relations in general. Second, Davidson’s monism requires an ontology of events for which no satisfactory criterion of (...) identity has been provided. Despite these problems, the paper argues that the theses on the anomalism and irreducibility of the mental remain acceptable, despite the difficulty of reconstructing precisely the arguments Davidson uses to defend them. (shrink)

The paper aims to investigate the ethical motive which led Husserl to defend the transcendental subjectivity. The central thesis is that phenomenological attitude is more than a pure methodical and theoretical approach on human subjectivity. Husserlian’s use of the transcendental ego has a practical purpose. Considering that phenomenology always begins by the suspension of the natural attitude, the possibility of this suspension implicates a paradox: the ego must preserve his belief in reason and science in order to carry out the (...) neutralization of its beliefs concerning natural attitude. This belief is crucial in order to understand the ethical meaning of the transcendental reduction which is the beginning of an entirely new form of life. (shrink)